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Foreword: Rights, Remedies, and Rose
Scott R. Bauries
INTRODUCTION
IN this Foreword to the University of Kentucky's "Rose at 20" Special
Feature, I seek to introduce the three featured articles, as well as to
identify two major paradigm shifts in school finance litigation that grew
out of the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Council for Better
Education.' The Rose decision is commonly thought of as a bridge between
prior education litigation strategies founded primarily on theories of
equity or equality and subsequent litigation strategies founded primarily
on theories of adequacy.3 Although the distinction between these two
i Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., summa cum
laude, 2005, University of Florida; Ph.D., 2oo9, University of Florida. I would like to extend
my most heartfelt thanks to the editors of the Kentucky Law Journal; to my colleagues Justin
Bathon and Neal Hutchens of the University of Kentucky College of Education; to the three
distinguished panelists who anchored the symposium that spawned the featured articles, R.
Craig Wood, William E. Thro, and William S. Koski; to our distinguished moderator, Kern
Alexander; and to the members of the Education Law Association for helping, each in very
meaningful ways, to bring the issue of education finance litigation and the importance of the
Rose case before a diverse audience of lawyers, academics, policy makers, and interested citi-
zens. I would especially like to thank Governor Steve Beshear and First Lady Jane Beshear
for their participation in and support of the symposium. Their tireless dedication to high-
quality education in the Commonwealth of Kentucky stands as an example to state leaders
everywhere. I would also like to thank Lee Todd, President of the University of Kentucky;
David Brennen, Dean of the University of Kentucky College of Law; and Mary John O'Hair,
Dean of the University of Kentucky College of Education for their participation and support.
Finally, special thanks go to the sponsors of the "Rose at 20" Symposium evening, Wyatt,
Tarrant & Combs, LLP and the Education Law Association.
2 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d I86 (Ky. 1989).
3 The scholarly community has generally categorized this litigation into three "waves"
of reform. See, e.g., Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. I I51, 1152 ('995) (adopting the "wave"
metaphor); William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance
Litigation, 14 J.L. & PoL. 525, 530 n.14 (1998) [hereinafter Thro, A New Approach] (outlin-
ing the "wave" metaphor); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 600-o4 (1994)
[hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis] (further outlining the "wave" metaphor). Recently,
scholars have begun to question the precision of the "wave" metaphor. See William S. Koski,
Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re--examination of the Jurisprudential History
of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 1185, 1283-96 (2003) (ex-
plaining that no clear line divides equality-based strategies from adequacy-based strategies,
and that in fact, both theories are present in most education finance cases); James E. Ryan,
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strategies is well-worn, it obscures two important changes to state
constitutional doctrine that help define where the post-Rose world began.
The plaintiffs in Rose sued on the theory that the educational resources in
the plaintiff districts were both inadequate and inequitable, but they won
a far-reaching judgment based primarily on the total inadequacy of the
entire state education system. 4 The two shifts I identify were integral to
this decision and have been emulated by several courts since.
Although the Rose decision is primarily noted for the success of adequacy
theory as a strategy for proving constitutional harm, less noticed doctrinal
innovations in Rose lay in the court's treatment of education rights and the
remedies warranted for their violation.' As to rights, the Kentucky court
was among the first to enforce the right to education as a positive individual
right.6 As to remediation, the Kentucky court ushered in the still-dominant
judicial view of separation of powers as an independent limit on judicial
review at the remedial stage of litigation.7 These two doctrinal changes
distinguished Rose from the litigation that preceded it, and they remain
relevant today.
I. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES BEFORE ROSE
Education reform litigation has always been concerned with rights.
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,' and continuing through San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez9 and the numerous school
finance cases that continue to be filed in most states, the courts have
been faced with the question of the right of each person to an education.
Although the United States Constitution contains no education provision,
Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 Tx. L. REv. 1223, 1237-38 (zoo8) (calling
into doubt the distinctions made between the second and third "waves"); id. at 1229 n.35 (cit-
ing Richard Briffault, AddingAdequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TIIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT
Or EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 25-27 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (critiqu-
ing the use of the "wave" metaphor )); see also William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate"
Isn't: The Retreatfrom Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J.
545, 547 (2oo6) (making the prescriptive case for preserving equity as the ultimate strategic
goal of school finance litigation). Nevertheless, the "wave" metaphor remains the dominant
shorthand utilized in describing the history of this litigation.
4 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190-91, 215. Debra H. Dawahare, who represented the plaintiff
districts, relates that, in referring to the relief that their clients ultimately received, lead coun-
sel and former Kentucky Governor Burt T Combs observed, "We asked for a thimbleful but
got a bucketful." See Debra H. Dawahare, Public School Reform: Kentucky's Solution, 27 U. ARK.
LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 27, 39 (2004).
5 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 2o5-o6, 214, z6.
6 Id. at zo6.
7 Id. at 214.
8 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,492-93 (1954).
9 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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each of the fifty states has in its constitution some provision mandating
the establishment and maintenance of a tuition-free school system in the
state. 0 A legitimate interpretation of such provisions is that they afford
each individual living in a state some sort of "right" to education.
But does this right require a certain quality of education for each child,
either by reference to the education that others receive or in the absolute?
Education finance litigation seeks the answer to this question. Courts in
most states have experienced constitutional challenges to state legislative
enactments establishingand funding the state's education system.I Initially,
plaintiffs brought challenges in federal and state courts based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Through its rulings
in Rodriguez that education is not a federal fundamental right,'" and that
wealth is not a suspect classification, 4 however, the United States Supreme
Court effectively closed the door to federal constitutional education rights
claims, other than claims directly seeking to enforce Brown. The Court has
kept the door closed through subsequent rulings."
The rejection of education funding litigation in federal courts shifted
this litigation to state courts and refocused it on state constitutions. 16
Initially, state-court suits were dominated by equity- and equality-based
theories of relief. 7 Often, the central questions in the early cases were the
same as those in Rodriguez.8 Thus, courts were asked to determine whether
education was a fundamental right in the state, or whether (real property)
wealth was a suspect classification, on the way to deciding whether to apply
strict scrutiny to legislative decisions allocating educational resources
unequally-typically through the maintenance of funding schemes heavily
reliant on ad valorem taxation of real property.19
In state courts, several of these suits were more successful than the
Rodriguez suit was in federal court. These successes occurred most often
where state courts declared that education was a fundamental, individual
Io R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE
AID PLANs-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 103-o8 (3d ed. 2007). I will refer to each such provi-
sion discussed herein as the relevant state's "education clause." For a complete collection of
the fifty state education clauses, see id.
I I See, e.g., Heise, supra note 3, at 115 1.
12 Id. at 1152.
13 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
14 Id. at 28-29.
15 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450,458 (1988) (declining to apply
strict scrutiny analysis to a state's requirement for the payment of a transportation fee before
a student could ride the public school bus).
16 Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 6o1--03.
17 Id. at6or.
18 Id. at 6oO-o3.
19 See WOOD, supra note 10, at 69-70 (outlining the history of the "equity" strategy).
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right under the state constitution, and state defendants could not justify
identified inequalities as narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest."0
The approach used during this era should sound familiar because it was
identical to the federal approach to fundamental rights,"' save that, unlike
under the Federal Constitution, education could actually be considered a
fundamental, individual right under some state constitutions."2
This mostly "lockstep" approach 3 to constitutional adjudication
supported several decisions-both for and against the state-during what
Professor Thro calls the "Second Wave"2 14 of education finance litigation,"
allowing plaintiffs bringing these suits to cite familiar precedent and to
place education rights into the familiar mold into which all constitutional
rights-state and federal-had previously fit comfortably: the mold of
negative rights. A negative constitutional right is one that creates in its
holder the power to prevent government actors from engaging in behavior
that infringes upon the right.2 6 For example, the negative right to equal
2o See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (declaring that the interaction
of the "fundamental interest" in education under the state constitution and the "suspect"
nature of the classification of local property wealth require the application of strict scrutiny);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (declaring the system to be in violation of
the state constitution's equality provisions and stating: "we must conclude that in Connecticut
the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be
strictly scrutinized").
21 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625-33 (1969) (applying strict
scrutiny to a New York education statute that only permitted landowners and the parents
of school children to vote in school board elections because the law placed a burden on the
fundamental right to vote, and it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state inter-
est).
22 This similarity illustrates the propensity of federal constitutional interpretive doctrine
to be adopted wholesale in the states, a practice which has been oft and famously criticized.
See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MIcH. L. REV.
761, 788-93 (1992) (explaining the problems revealed by the "lockstep" interpretive approach
utilized by many state supreme courts in adjudicating individual rights claims under state
constitutions, treating federal and state rights doctrine as indistinguishable); see also William
J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489,
491 (977) (admonishing state courts to develop their own conceptions of individual rights
independent of federal doctrine); Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows": Pennsylvania's
Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PuB. L.
343,347-48 (1993) (criticizing the "lockstep" approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
interpreting the various equality-based provisions of the state constitution by applying fed-
eral equal protection doctrine); Robert F Williams, Foreword: The Importance of an Independent
State Constitutional Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REv. 675,
678 (1992) (leveling a similar critique against the Connecticut Supreme Court).
23 See WOOD, supra note Io, at 69-70 (outlining the history of the "equity" strategy).
24 Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 6oi-o3.
25 See WooD, supra note Io, at 69-70.
26 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864,
864-66 (1986) (outlining the concepts of positive and negative rights and evaluating com-
monly recognized constitutional rights under these competing paradigms).
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protection allows its holder to prevent the government from treating the
holder differently from those similarly situated. 7 The negative right to
procedural due process of law allows the holder to prevent the government
from taking the holder's life, liberty, or property without providing the
holder with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.28 This
conception of rights was and remains the most familiar one to federal
constitutional adjudication, 9 and it was the dominant conception of rights
evident in state constitutional litigation over education finance until Rose
was decided.
Importantly, to avoid violating a negative right, all the government
must do in most cases is simply refrain from taking unconstitutional
action.30 Thus, if the government is determined to be acting in violation
of a negative right to equality by operating a funding scheme that makes
educational resource levels dependent on unequal local property wealth, it
need only eliminate the influence of local property wealth from the formula
to remedy the harm. So, for example, if a state's education finance system
were to be held unconstitutional based on its violation of the negative
rights to equal protection held by those in property-poor districts, valid
remedial responses might include eliminating a local effort requirement
for local districts, engaging in resource recapture to equalize ultimate
local revenues, or applying state revenue to guarantee an equal tax yield
for equal millage rates among local districts-basically any approach that
would eliminate or neutralize the affirmative inclusion of local property
27 See id. at 88o-81.
z8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I.
29 Judge Posner has most directly stated this widely-held view. See, e.g., Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties;
it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to
provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order."). This negative
view of the rights embedded in the Federal Constitution has been widely criticized in the
scholarly community. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 2271, 2272-73 (199o); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A
Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409-13 (199o). One
scholar has recently extended these arguments to make a forceful case for a positive right
to education under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, s16 YALE L.J. 330, 334-35 (2OO6) (locating a federal positive right to ade-
quate education in the Fourteenth Amendment). Nevertheless, the negative rights paradigm
endures in the federal courts.
30 Of course, remedies for the violation of negative rights have often required specific
actions on the part of the government (orders to desegregate school districts, for example).
Nevertheless, each of these remedial orders was crafted to remedy a harm caused by affirma-
tive government action in violation of the rights of identifiable individuals, and such harm
could have been avoided in every case by the simple expedient of refraining from acting
in violation of these individual rights (by never forcibly assigning black students and white
students to strictly segregated schools, for example). See Currie, supra note 26, at 873-74
(making this same point in the context of other affirmative orders to remedy violations of
negative rights).
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wealth as a distinguishing factor in local funding.
The plaintiffs during the Second Wave achieved some notable victories,
and theywere successful atconvincingcourts to orderthese types of remedies
for inequality in some states. Nevertheless, they also noticed and lamented
the potential for these negative remedies to result in an equality of poverty,
the political impracticality of recapture and redistribution from wealthier
districts to poorer ones, and the sheer ineffectiveness of equalizing funding
where local factors often require extra funding to equalize opportunities.3'
A new approach was needed, but the old conceptions of education as a
negative right could not support it.
II. RosE AND RIGHTS
When Chief Justice Stephens conceived the form of the Rose opinion
late during a sleepless night at his home in Lexington,3" he doubtless had
little idea that the decision would do more than invalidate the indisputably
inadequate system of education33 then in place in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky--or at least "destabilize" 34 it, as Professor Koski puts it.
Nevertheless, the opinion did much more. It ushered in the new "Third
Wave" of education finance litigation.3" It showed that, despite the lingering
failures of equity-based litigation, state supreme courts were not ready to
leave the field of education finance yet. It also catalyzed the complete
overhaul of the education system in Kentucky, resulting in measurable
improvements in outcomes and large expenditure increases.
Most importantly, though, the opinion ushered in a paradigm shift
among state courts by enforcing a conception of education as a conception
of education as a positive individual right under the state constitution. In
contrast to a negative individual right, which merely allows the holder to
prevent unconstitutional government actions, a positive right theoretically
allows its holder to compel government action.36 That is, a holder of
31 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise
of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L.
REV. 543,579-85 (1998) (explaining these theories and introducing the alternative explanation
that remedies did not have their desired effects of centralization of and increases in spend-
ing).
32 See William H. Fortune, Tribute to Robert F Stephens, in Joseph E. Lambert et al., Tribute
to Robert F Stephens, 91 Ky. L.J. 289, 296 (zoo3) ("[Chief Justice Stephens] told the students
that he woke in the middle of the night, and unable to sleep for thinking about the case, he
went downstairs for a vodka and tonic and-Eureka!-it came to him-'The whole system
must be struck down as unconstitutional.'").
33 See Dawahare, supra note 4, at 32-33 (describing the sad state of the education system
in Kentucky at the time of the suit).
34 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
35 See Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 603.
36 See Currie, supra note 26, at 864.
[Vol. 98
2009-20101 FOREWORD: RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND ROSE 709
a positive right has the ability to compel the political branches to act to
further the holder's constitutional interest, rather than simply the power to
prevent the political branches from interfering with it.
Identifying an individual right to adequate education under the
Kentucky Constitution, the Rose court held:
A child's right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under
our Constitution. The General Assembly must protect and advance that right. We
concur with the trial court that an efficient system of education must have
as its goal to provide each and every child with at least the seven following
capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii)
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge
and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural
and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child
to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in
the job market.37
The requirement to "protect and advance" the "right to adequate
education" is a textbook statement of a legislative duty correlative to a
positive individual right.3"
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in stating this positive conception
of individual rights and legislative duties relating to education, opened
the doctrinal door to adequacy as a theory of relief.39 For, without the
37 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis
added).
38 The notion that duties and rights are "jural correlatives" was first developed byWesley
Newcomb Hohfeld in two seminal articles. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 7 10, 710, 717 ( 917); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16,
30-37 (1913).
39 Some may argue that the 1979 case of Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979), was
the first state supreme court opinion to conceive of education rights in this way. It is true that
the Pauley court interpreted the "thorough and efficient" language of the state constitution to
derive the fundamentality of education rights in the state, and it is true that the Pauley court
set forth several principles inherent in a "thorough and efficient" system as part of its formula-
tion. See id. at 877 (listing elements of a "thorough and efficient" education system). It is also
true that the Rose court cited the Pauky opinion with approval in developing its own standard.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209-io. However, a close reading of the Pauley opinion reveals that, as of
1979, there was no paradigm shift. The Pauy court, after declaring the right to education
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
grounding of a positive individual right to a certain quality of education
resources, education finance adequacy claims present nothing more than
broad, generalized grievances claiming that state appropriations should
be increased. The existence of positive individual rights, however, gives
these claims constitutional significance. Simply put: policy decisions
are subject to legitimate dispute, and judges should question the value
of their involvemeht in such disputes, but infringements upon rights
call for judicial correction. 40 Indeed, state courts today often hold up an
individual's right to education under the state constitution as a justification
for judicial review in the face of separation of powers objections. 4' Thus,
Rose provided plaintiffs in school finance adequacy cases with a powerful
tool for surmounting the initial hurdle of justiciability-the tool of positive
"fundamental" in the state and listing its elements of a "thorough and efficient" education,
went on to conduct the familiar equal protection analysis that had been adopted wholesale
from the federal courts to adjudicate governmental violations of negative equality rights:
We conceive that both our equal protection and thorough and
efficient constitutional principles can be applied harmoniously to the
State school financing system. Certainly, the mandatory requirement
of "a thorough and efficient system of free schools," found in Article
XII, Section 1 of our Constitution, demonstrates that education is a
fundamental constitutional right in this State.
Because education is a fundamental constitutional right in this
State, then, under our equal protection guarantees any discriminatory
classification found in the educational financing system cannot stand
unless the State can demonstrate some compelling State interest to
justify the unequal classification.
Pauky, 255 S.E.2d at 878 (citations omitted). An even better argument can be made that the
Washington Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Seattle SchoolDistrict v. State, 585 P. 2d 71 (Wash.
1978), accomplished the paradigm shift identified here. In Seattle, the court actually both
articulated and applied a positive rights-based conception of the state's education clause,
striking down the legislature's use of special excise levies to fund the system. See id. at 98-104.
However, and perhaps due to the uniquely strong language of the Washington Constitution,
which designates education as a "paramount duty of the state," see id. at 91, education finance
plaintiffs failed to adopt a positive rights conception to ground challenges under other state
constitutions until after Rose was decided more than ten years later. Thus, both the Pauley
opinion and the Seattle opinion, while important in laying the foundation for Rose, failed to
accomplish the paradigm shift in conceptions of education rights that Rose accomplished.
40 This distinction stems from the Supreme Court's initial articulation of both the prac-
tice of judicial review and the limits placed on such review of political questions in the vener-
able case Marbury v. Madison. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (0 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,
can never be made in this court.").
41 See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 48-49, on file with author) (discussing the individual rights justification used in
several state courts to overcome justiciability concerns).
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rights.
III. RosE AND REMEDIES
The innovation of the Rose court did not stop with its shifting of rights
paradigms. The court ultimately held the entire state education system
unconstitutional, and was immediately faced with the question of how to
fashion a remedy. It simply would not do to employ the familiar negative-
rights approach and enjoin the offending legislation from being applied
to the aggrieved rights-holders-that would have left the children of
Kentucky with no education at all as a remedy for inadequate education.
Perhaps the court could have taken notice of the numerous desegregation
cases that had reached consent decrees in the federal courts and attempted
to fashion a monitoring system like those in place to enforce these
desegregation decrees. 4 The will was certainly there, and it would seem
that, if the entire system needed to be redesigned, it would help to have the
court involved in the redesign to make sure that it was completed. However,
unlike the federal courts carrying out desegregation consent decrees, the
Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with a state constitutional provision
specifically mandating the distribution and separation of governmental
powers.4
3
Separation of powers clauses are unique features of many state
constitutions that create a very clear contrast with the more familiar Federal
Constitution, which has no language relating to separation of powers.'
Kentucky's version of this command appears in two clauses. The first,
mandating the distribution of the powers of government, provides:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined
to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to
one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another.45
The second, prohibiting encroachment upon one branch's powers by a
member of another branch, provides:
No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except
42 For a comprehensive, but critical overview of these decrees, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-170 (zd ed. 2008).
43 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213-14 (outlining the separation of powers provisions upon
consideration of remedial matters).
44 Id. at 214.
45 Ky. CONST. § 27.
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in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.'
In evaluating the portion of the trial court's order establishing judicial
monitoring, which would have required periodic status reports from the
legislature on the progress of the reform of the system, the Rose court cited
these provisions, rejected just the portion of the trial court opinion that
would have maintained enforcement jurisdiction, and stated:
One last point must be disposed of. We are referred by appellees to
several federal cases where federal courts maintained continuing supervision
over its own order-e.g., supervision of prisons, court ordered busing, etc.
The United States Constitution has no separation of powers provision
within it. The separation of powers doctrine in the Federal area, has been
recognized in federal common law. We on the other hand, are faced with a
strongly written, definitive constitutional scheme. We must, perforce, follow
our constitution. The federal cases and situations referred to are clearly not
even persuasive here.47
Following that pronouncement, the court "decline[d] to issue any
injunctions, restraining orders, writs of prohibition or writs of mandamus. 4
The court also did not retain jurisdiction over the case.49
In so deciding, the Rose court was the first to employ what I have
elsewhere referred to as "remedial abstention." 0 Judicial abstention from
the remedial process after rendering a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
is, as far as I can tell, unique to education finance litigation. This form
of abstention is similar to the form of abstention that results from the
application of the political question doctrine, and it stems from identical
concerns. The political question doctrine counsels courts to abstain
from adjudicating the merits of claims over which they otherwise have
jurisdiction, due to concern for the separation of powers and the potential
for irreconcilable conflicts with a coordinate branch of government.5'
Remedial abstention, as exemplified by the Rose court, also results
from a concern over separation of powers, focusing on the inevitable
intrusion upon the functions of a coordinate branch that would result from
active judicial remediation.5 s The only doctrinal difference between the
46 Id. § z8.
47 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214.
48 Id. at 215.
49 Id. at 15-t6.
50 See Bauries, supra note 41 (manuscript at 52-54, on file with author).
51 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (explaining the political question doctrine
as "primarily a function of the separation of powers").
52 See Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School Reform Law, 28
HtAv. J. ON LEGIs. 367,370 (i9i) (describing the influence of the explicit separation of pow-
ers provisions in the Kentucky Constitution and the general concerns over the practicality of
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two appears to be the timing of the decision to abstain, but the practical
difference is that remedial abstention at least allows the court to construe
the constitution and decide whether the challenged legislative action
satisfies it, while total abstention at the threshold stage of litigation avoids
all review of the merits.5 3
The appeal of this approach is understandable. Judicially directed
or monitored remediation of constitutional harms to individual rights to
adequate educational resources would inevitably place the courts in direct
or indirect control of state appropriations and revenue policy. Indeed, in
the few cases where injunctive remedies have been ordered, these remedial
orders have tended to do just that.-' In contrast, remedial abstention allows
for a court to construe the state constitution, but to avoid any activity that
could be considered legislating.
In Kentucky, remedial abstention seems to have worked-the
legislature took its cue from the court and enacted the most sweeping
education reform legislation then seen."5 In other states, however, the
data on remedial abstention are inconclusive. s6 Even in Kentucky, the
original plaintiffs recently returned to court to seek similar relief, albeit
unsuccessfully.5 7 Since Rose was decided, however, courts throughout the
country have taken notice of this approach to remediation, and several
have adopted it."' Thus, although the use of remedial abstention may be
any remedial order against the legislature as the primary concerns in the case).
53 Referring to the then-nascent approach as "remedial deference," Professor George D.
Brown has termed the decisions employing remedial abstention "binding advisory opinions."
See George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State School
Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543,563-67 (994) (analyzing the unique remedial approach
then emergent in the state courts in education finance cases). My own analysis of the cases
persuades me that, if "deference" to the legislature is indeed what is being displayed, then
such deference is total at the remedial stage. Thus, I prefer the term "remedial abstention" as
a more precise description of the approach used by the Rose court and many that followed it.
54 See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 940 (Kan. 2005) ("Specifically, no later than
July I, 2005, for the 2oo5-o6 school year, the legislature shall implement a minimum increase
of $285 million above the funding level for the 2o04-05 school year, which includes the $142
million presently contemplated in H.B. 2247.").
55 See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The
Kentucky Case, z8 HAtv. j. ON LEGIS. 341, 343 (199I) ("The court's decision led directly to a
complete revision of the scheme of school finance and substantial modification in the organi-
zation and administration of the public schools. The case caused the legislature to fashion new
tax legislation which resulted in increased revenues of over one billion dollars.").
56 See Bauries, supra note 41 (manuscript at z8, on file with author); Michael Heise,
Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 105 (zoo) (relat-
ing the success of the Massachusetts experience with remedial abstention, which Heise calls
"passive dialogue").
57 See Young v. Williams, No. 03 -CI-<055 & No. 03-CI-o1 152 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Feb.
13, 2oo7) (order & opinion granting summary judgment to the state defendants, based on the
failure to demonstrate inadequacy of the system).
58 See, e.g., Hull v. Albrecht, 96o P.zd 634,640 (Ariz. 1998) (invalidating legislative action
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criticized, 9 it presents an attractive way of simultaneously valuing both
judicial review and the separation of powers, and its use in Rose stands as an
important innovation in state constitutional law adjudication.
IV. RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND RosE AT 20
As one can readily see from even a brief perusal of the literature,
scholarship of education finance litigation is often concerned with the
extent of judicial power and the proper parameters of its use. 6° In the
preceding sections, and by way of a preface to the featured papers in this
issue, I have offered my view of the paradigm shifts that Rose engendered in
two important facets of this larger topic-judicial conceptions of education
rights and judicial approaches to remediation.
Each of the three main papers included in this Special Feature wrestles
with the difficult question of the legitimacy of judicial involvement in
in establishing capital facilities funding on adequacy grounds, but deferring to the legisla-
ture as to a remedy, stating, "Accordingly, in deference to legislative authority and intent, we
invalidate the entire Act, thereby enabling the legislature to reconsider the entire financing
mechanism in light of the constitutional requirement that a 'general and uniform' system can-
not allow some districts to employ local funding mechanisms that the state system withholds
from other districts"); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 129 P.3 d 1199, 1208-o9
(Idaho 2005) (after holding portions of the state system unconstitutional, abstaining from any
specific remediation out of concern for judicial usurpation of the legislative role to determine
policy); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552-54 (Mass. 1993)
(invalidating the state education system on adequacy grounds, but abstaining from remedia-
tion); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d
257, 261-63 (deferring to the legislature to define an adequate education); DeRolph v. State,
677 N.E.2d 733, 747 & n.9 (Ohio 1997) (after holding the state system unconstitutional on
adequacy grounds, declining to order specific remedial action because it would encroach on
a "clearly legislative function"); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541
(S.C. 1999) (after determining that educational adequacy was justiciable, admonishing the
trial court on remand not to order any policy-directive remedy if a violation were identi-
fied, so as not to become a "super-legislature"); W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107
S.W 3 d 558, 563-64, 582 (Tex. 2003) (reaffirming the judiciary's authority and responsibility
to adjudicate educational adequacy, but also leaving it to the legislature to determine how to
meet the constitutional standard); Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715, 72 1-22 (Vt. 2005) (explain-
ing that remediation of a constitutional violation on adequacy grounds would consist only of a
declaration of unconstitutionality).
59 I have been a recent critic of this approach, arguing that remedial abstention places
legislatures in the difficult position of having to continually guess at whether their responsive
actions are sufficient. Scott R. Bauries, Judicial Review and the Separation of Powers in State
Constitutional Litigation Challenging the Adequacy of Education Spending: Complementary
Analyses and a Proposed Adjudicatory Model 2oo-o6 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with University of Florida Library System and
Pro--Quest Digital Dissertation Database); see also Heise, supra note 56, at io6 ("Specifically,
problems-both theoretical and practical-arise when courts clearly articulate a constitutional
right that for whatever reason defies an adequate constitutional remedy.").
6o See Bauries, supra note 41 (manuscript at 21-35, on file with author).
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education finance cases, just as the Rose court and most other state supreme
courts have had to, and each comes to a different conclusion regarding the
proper extent, scope, direction, and goals of school finance litigation. From
these varying scholarly perspectives we gain a richer understanding of the
challenges that such litigation presents to the legitimacy of judicial review
and remediation of alleged state constitutional harms, as well as the promise
that such litigation may hold in helping to secure the benefits of education
for all on equitable terms.
Professor R. Craig Wood presents and analyzes justiciability concerns in
light of the influence of advocacy organizations in many education finance
cases, focusing his analysis on the scientifically dubious methodologies
employed by expert witnesses at the merits adjudication stage as a means of
illustrating the lack of judicially manageable standards of adjudication.61
Professor William E. Thro begins from the proposition that the cases
are uniformly justiciable, but contends that merits adjudication and
remediation should be approached from a judicially "humble" posture-
meaning maintaining fidelity to the constitutional text and giving effect
to complementary constitutional provisions (such as separation of powers
clauses) without abdicating the judicial role.6" Professor Thro situates the
Rose court as an early exemplar of a (mostly) "humble" court.63
Professor William S. Koski provides an illuminating analysis of modern
education finance litigation as a form of institutional reform litigation
highlighting the "destabilization" function of judging.' 4 Professor Koski
sees the Rose case as an early (but not necessarily catalytic) exemplar of
this emerging approach to litigation-based reform, whereby courts act as
facilitative, but not directive, participants in a highly interactive process of
building constitutional meaning among many stakeholders. 6s
None of these papers specifically state their primary focus as an
evaluation of the legitimacy of the exercise of judicial review in Rose or the
cases that followed it. However, each paper offers a unique and nuanced
perspective of the development and implementation of state constitutional
norms in the field of education, and each offers a unique normative view
of the expanses and limitations of the judicial role in education policy
6i See R. Craig Wood, Rose at Twenty: Justiciability, Adequacy, Advocacy, and the American
Dream, 98 Ky. L.J. 739 (2010).
6z SeeWilliam E. Thro, Judicial Humiliy; The EnduringLegacy of Rose v. Council for Better
Education, 98 Ky. L.J. 717 (zoIo).
63 Thro, supra note 6z, at 722.
64 See William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Tears After
Rose, 98 Ky. L.J. 789,793 (2oto) (citing James S. Liebman & Charles Sabel,A PublicLaboratory
Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y. U.
REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 183, 207 (2oo3); Charles Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HAxv. L. REV. 1015, 1016-28 (2003)).
65 Koski, supra note 64, at 794.
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reform. These papers also demonstrate the enduring importance of the
Rose decision in shaping the way that we think about constitutional rights,
legislative duties, inter-branch relations, and litigation as a means to
achieve public policy reforms in the states.
